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Introduction
In this article, I will draw upon and elucidate the myth of Cupid and 
Psyche in order to show its importance as an overarching metaphor for 
The Sickness Unto Death. This particular myth plays a role in philosophy 
and literature rather like that of the Songs of Songs in theology: it is an al­
legory. As Solomon’s song is considered an allegory of Christ’s relation­
ship to the church, so the myth of Psyche and Cupid represents Love 
and its relationship to the soul. That Kierkegaard was familiar with this 
myth before the publication of The Sickness Unto Death in 1849 can be 
inferred from his citing, in three different places in 1843, Cupid’s in­
junction to Psyche about remaining silent: Either/Or (Part I), Fear and 
Trembling, and his journal (IV A 28, n.d. 1842-43).1 However, the exclu­
sive nature of this reference could imply, in its narrowness, that Kierke­
gaard was only familiar with this particular passage of the story. On the 
other hand, it could also mean that this particular passage was especially 
important to him at that time regarding salient themes in his life and 
work. I think this second possibility somewhat more likely as he states in 
a journal entry in 1852 (X4 A 462) that he was ‘reading the story [of 
Amor and Psyche] in Apuleius again this very day’.2 However, such an 
‘again’ does seem rather timeless.
But, as I stated above, it is not a one-to-one correlation between the 
two works that I wish to establish; rather, I would like to explore the 
idea of the myth as the fertile soil from which the seeds of Kierkegaard’s 
ideas of self and despair spring forth. That this is a plausible hypothesis 
can be supported by an almost — but not quite — contemporary journal 
entry (X2 A 614, n.d. 1850):3 ‘Psyche would not be satisfied with faith; 
it was, to be sure, possible that the invisible being who visited her was a
monster — so she looked, and saw what she lost’. In other words, if she 
had only had faith, Psyche would have stayed with Regi —, I mean Cu­
pid. Furthermore, as we all know, the opposite of faith is sin (see Romans 
14:23), and sin is despair, and despair is the sickness unto death.4 Being 
unsatisfied with faith, Psyche embraced this sickness unto death — rather 
like Cleopatra her asp, and became the protoype of despair. But she also 
became the immortal soul. In the myth of her transformation lies, I 
think, the lyrical power of poetry that even Kierkegaard himself claims is 
missing from The Sickness Unto Death — due to the book’s dialectical, all 
too dialectical, nature (VIII1 A 651-2).5
This myth itself, from the second century A.D., is Roman and re­
corded only by Apuleius in his book The Golden Ass.6 It consists of four 
major sections which might be ironically entitled: (1) Psyche’s Pre-Mari- 
tal Despair, (2) Psyche’s Marital Despair, (3) Psyche’s Post-Marital De­
spair, and (4) Psyche’s Entrance into Immortality. Because of the pagan 
nature of the myth, it should be readily apparent that this metaphor for 
despair pertains almost exclusively to the first part of 77te Sickness Unto 
Death wherein the sickness is described. The myth of Cupid and Psyche 
is a metaphor for diagnosis, not necessarily for cure. Nor is the myth to 
be considered a detailed reckoning or algebra (see VIII1 A 652) ;7 rather, 
like all myths, it is evocative. Its aim is to educate, not the mind but 
rather the very thing whose creation it also seeks to explain: namely, the 
soul, which, as a term in the story’s exegesis, should be considered the 
mythical analogue to Kierkegaard’s self.
The Spirit and the Self
According to Kierkegaard: The human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spir­
it is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which relates to itself or 
that in the relation which is its relating to itself The self is not the relation but 
the relation’s relating to itself. A  human being is a synthesis of the infinite and 
the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity. In short a 
synthesis. A  synthesis is a relation between two terms. Looked at in this way a 
human being is not yet a self.8
With those rather mesmerizing — if not mystifying — words, Kierke­
gaard begins Part One of The Sickness Unto Death. He continues by stating 
that in a relation between two things the relation is the third term in the form of 
a negative unity, and the two relate to the relation, and in the relation to that re­
lation; this is what it is from the point of view of soul for soul and body to be in 
relation. If on the other hand, the relation relates to itself then this relation is 
the positive third, and this is the self9
If the above paragraphs hold true, they quite deftly reveal the funda­
mental error of American semiotician C.S. Peirces object-oriented phe­
nomenology.10 In order to explain this Kierkegaard stronger conception of 
self, let me begin with a description of the Kierkegaard’s weaker concep­
tion of self as it appears in The Sickness Unto Death, set forth, as it is, in al­
most Peircean semiotic fashion.11 To wit, there are three distinct terms in 
relationship to one another. The primary dyadic relation is that of synthe­
sis; namely, a synthesis between the infinite and the finite, the temporal 
and the eternal, the free and the necessary. Such a synthesis is called a hu­
man being, the synthesis of possibility and necessity; however, it is not yet 
called a self (the third term). In virtue of its not yet being a self, neither 
can the human being be considered a spirit, for spirit is the self.
And why is it not yet a self? Because the relation, the synthesis, does 
not actually relate back upon itself or, and perhaps more importantly, 
there is nothing in the relation, the synthesis, which is relating to the 
synthesis itself. To speak metaphorically, and no doubt quite accurately, 
this synthesis is spatial, maybe even ‘static’. This non-dynamic relation 
Kierkegaard dubs a ‘third term in the form of a negative unity’. To illus­
trate his point, he presents the example of the soul’s relation to the body, 
an example which readily lends itself to Peircean analysis. Inasmuch as 
the body might be considered an object (i.e., unaware of its participation 
in the relation), the soul could be considered the perceiver of the soul- 
body relation. When Kierkegaard says that the ‘two relate to the rela­
tion’ he simply means that the soul can be viewed as embodied and the 
body as ensouled. Moreover, that they can relate ‘in relation to that rela­
tion’ simply means that there is some sort of given soul-body relation. 
But it is negative, fundamentally unproductive; it is an aggregate of two 
units (body, soul) mediated conceptually, but not existentially, by the 
thought ‘soul-body relation’. In some way, it is, in fact, an imperfect 
synthesis; nonetheless, in Peircean terms, this thought, this Third, this 
‘body-soul relation’ can be used to confront and explain future objects 
and events. Thus, for Peirce, mediation can occur conceptually, even 
though it does not take place existentially. For this reason, Peircean Third- 
ness is Kierkegaard’s ‘negative third’ term, and, as such, genuinely fails to 
broach the existential.
However, ‘if, on the other hand, the relation relates to itself, then
this relation is the positive third, and this is the self.’ But what does it 
means for a relation to relate to itself? Well, I think a rather earthly (and 
earthy) example would be that of a marriage. A marriage is neither the 
man nor the woman alone; it is made up of a husband and a wife. If one 
exists without the other, it is no longer a marriage. Yet, in this sense, a 
marriage is, in effect, a negative third, a static relation. It is merely ‘two 
relate[d] to the relation’. The man relates to the woman qua wife through 
marriage and the woman relates to the man qua husband through mar­
riage. They are related ‘in the relation to that relation’. Marriage is the 
Peircean Thirdness that mediates the man and the woman. But, then, 
something amazing happens. Children! The relation has related to itself 
and produced a child. It is by virtue of their union, their relation, that 
the children have arrived. Now, the woman must relate to the man as 
both a husband and as the father of children, and the man to the woman 
as a wife and as the mother of children. The relation has changed. It is 
now one of a family. This is the positive Third for Kierkegaard. Or what, 
in other words, might be called a ‘Peircean’ Fourth’12 the idea that cer­
tains Thirds have lives of their own beyond their inherent Thirdness or 
subsequent Firstness; they have, in and of themselves, existential ramifi­
cations.13
Another example of a positive Kierkegaardian Third, and perhaps the 
prototypical one, is that of the Trinity. According to the Scottish theolo­
gian George MacDonald, what fundamentally distinguishes Christ (God 
the Obedient or God the Son) from Jehovah (God the Commanding or 
God the Father) is merely the objects of their loves. The Father loves the 
Son, and the Son loves the Father. The spirit which unites or mediates 
this complete reciprocal surrender of love(s) is the Holy Spirit.14 The na­
ture of that relation or mediation is so complete, so active in its relation to 
itself, as to warrant a relation of mutual personhood among the three par­
ticipants: Father, Son, and their Mediator. This relationship created a new 
and distinct entity: the Trinity — which, as a unity, is, in fact, a Fourth.15
As with the Trinity, so with the self. A human being (a Peircean 
Third or negative Kierkegaardian third) is a synthesis of conflicting traits, 
X ’s and Y’s, which will not become a self (a ‘Peircean’ Fourth or positive 
Kierkegaardian third) despite embodiment or creation because the active 
element, spirit, is missing. That there may, in fact, be a difference be­
tween spirit and self at some level is, I think, reflected in the fact that 
Kierkegaard states that the self ‘is a relation which relates to itself, or that 
in the relation which is its relating to itself.’ In other words, self is a
noun (relation) which verbs (relates) or is its verbing (relating). It is ac­
tive. It is spirit — which is a verbal construct. Case in point, it is the Spir­
it of God (not God himself) which moves out upon the waters (Genesis 
1:2) and the Spirit which, like the wind, moves where it wills (John 3:8). 
Spirit is internal movement that has external signs. This is preceisely 
Christs point, according to John 3:8, ‘The wind blows wherever it pleas­
es. You hear its sound, but you cannot tell where it comes from or 
where it is going.’
It is precisely at this juncture that Peirce’s project fails. For Peirce, 
everything is a sign; thus, there always exists a static moment of compre­
hension in which the sign’s mystery, its movement, its spirit, if you will, 
is apprehended (in both senses of the word), and consequently results in 
a moment when everything, being apprehended, is understood and thus 
rendered static. Moreover, because everything is a sign and, fundamen­
tally, the sign of another sign, indeterminacy (or mystery) is a linear phe­
nomenon moving parallel with time through time. Thus, it is, in a sense, 
a mere illusion of temporality. Because indeterminacy does not lie with­
in time, existence then, for Peirce, has no depth. It cannot be transcend­
ed; nor is it transcendent. To quote Christ again, this time from the 
Gospel of Matthew (16:3), ‘You know how to interpret the appearance of 
the sky, but you cannot interpret the signs of the times. A Peirce, too, 
could (and did) develop a semiotic that explained how and why we in­
terpret the signs for forecasting weather — a phenomenon which is really 
nothing more than a succession of signs through time; but he could not 
and would not interpret the signs of the times. For Kierkegaard, by con­
trast, the signs of his times, of his present age ‘an age of despair’16 were of 
the utmost interest, and they were the phenomena that precipitated his 
writing The Sickness Unto Death.
To return to Kierkegaard’s discussion of the self, he points out that 
such a relation, which relates to itself a self must either have established itself or 
been established by something else,17 To begin with a contrast, in the case of 
the Trinity, I think it safe to observe that this is probably the unique ex­
ample of a ‘self-established self’ if, in fact, any of these words can realis­
tically be applied to the Trinity in a theo/logical sense. But the example 
of marriage illustrates a synthesizing relation that has to be established by 
something else, something from outside the relation. Otherwise it is not 
a mediating relation, a valid marriage, a positive third.
In many religious traditions, a marriage is validated by the mediating 
activity of God. God, and perhaps the State, establishes the couple as
husband and wife, as something different from that day forward than 
what they were even a few moments before the ceremony That some 
sort of ‘objective’ mediating other is necessary to establish a relation of 
positive thirds can be seen in the American slave tradition of jumping 
the broom’ to solemnize a marriage — which nonetheless required the 
impersonal mediating and establishing activity of the broom!
If the relation which relates to itself has been established by something else, 
then of course the relation is the third term, but then this relation, the third term, 
is a relation which relates in turn to that which has established the whole rela­
tion.18 Given that ‘the relation which relates to itself’ is, in fact, a self, we 
see that if the [self] has been established by something else, then of course the 
[self] is the third term, but then this [self], the third term, is a [self] which re­
lates in turn to that which has established the whole [self]. By this, I take 
Kierkegaard to mean that if the self has been established or created by an 
other, then this self is a positive third which not only relates to itself but 
also relates to that which created it not merely as an active relation but 
which also established the various parts of it which were brought togeth­
er and mediated by the self (the whole relation). If this is the case, then the 
only possibility for the ‘something else’ is God. To return to the exam­
ple of marriage, we can say God mediates a marriage in a much pro­
founder manner than we can say that the State does, for God can also be 
said to have established (created) the various parts of the marriage rela­
tion that are being mediated, namely the husband and the wife qua hu­
man beings. The state can make no such claims, at least not in the strong 
sense. If these ‘arguments’ hold for marriage, then they hold qua analo­
gies for the self.
Obviously, such ‘arguments’ as these have little discursive value. Anal­
ogy is the weakest form of argument, and this weakness often denotes a 
text whose purpose is other than a scholarly one. Its main purpose is, 
perhaps, to be somewhat edifying, and in the realm of the edifying and 
existential, both analogy and allegory have great strength. To that end, in­
asmuch as myths are allegories, I would like to take up the story of Cupid 
and Psyche, Love and the Soul, as illustrative of The Sickness Unto Death.
The Myth O f Love and the Soul
Such a derived, established relation is the human self, a relation which relates 
to it-self and in relating to itself relates to something else. That is why there
can be two forms of authentic despair. If the human self were self-established, 
there would only be a question of one form: not wanting to be itself wanting to 
be rid of itself 19
In the first section, Psyche, the most beautiful of mortals, has incurred 
the wrath of Venus who has become jealous of the young girl. Apparently, 
Psyche s many suitors — in their devotion to a mere mortal — have neglect­
ed the goddess and her temples. In revenge, Venus calls upon her son, 
Cupid, to pierce Psyche with one of his arrows and cause the girl to fall 
in love with a most vile and unworthy suitor. A well-thought punishment 
as far as irony is concerned since Psyche s beauty, while it caused many to 
admire and even worship her, caused no man to love her.
So Cupid descends to perform his mother s errand, and -  just as if 
one of his own arrows had struck his heart — he falls hopelessly in love 
with Psyche. This event coincides with Psyche s father — desperate to 
marry the girl off -  seeking the advice of an oracle of the god Apollo 
which tells him that Psyche, dressed in deepest mourning, must be 
placed on a mountaintop and there receive her husband, a winged-ser- 
pent. Upon hearing this, Psyche resignes herself to her fate and is glad­
dened that her end has come. But the oracle, of course, is Apollo speak­
ing upon behalf of the lovestruck Cupid. In fear and trembling over 
their daughters fate, Psyches parents send her, per the oracles instruc­
tions, to the mountaintop where she is carried away, not by a winged- 
serpent, but by the gentle breeze Zephyr, who places her to sleep in a 
pleasant meadow.
Thus ends Psyche s single life. Yet in her single life we see the despair 
of not wanting to be herself; of her wanting, in fact, to be rid of herself. 
She welcomes the death that Apollo has (apparently) predicted for her. 
She is sick of being Psyche the beautiful, Psyche the unloved. She is, fun­
damentally, sick of herself. But she is not really Psyche the unloved. Cu­
pid does love her. But regardless of that love s existence, Psyche despairs. 
Because, at this juncture, the existence of divine love has no bearing on 
the beloveds state of despair, it matters not whether or not there is, in 
fact, a god, or — in other words — whether the self is posited by a third or 
by itself. For this reason, we see that this despair would have existed even 
if Psyche had no Olympian lover or (in Kierkegaardian terms) had her 
self, her soul, been established by herself (itself) and no other.
There could be no question of wanting in despair to be oneself For this latter 
formula is the expression of the relation’s (the self’s) total dependence, the expres­
sion of the fact that the self cannot by itself arrive at or remain in equilibrium and
rest, but only, in relating to itself, by relating to that which has established the 
whole relation. Indeed, so far from its being simply the case that this second form 
of despair (wanting in despair to be oneself) amounts to a special form on its own, 
all despair can in the end be resolved into or reduced to it.20
Upon awakening, she finds herself in a beautiful palace in which she 
is taken care of by magical ‘voices’, much like Beauty in the fairytale 
‘Beauty and the Beast’. And, at night, she meets her lover. But they can 
meet only at night. She must not see him. And, at first, she is content 
with this. She knows he is no monster. However, during the day, she be­
gins to miss human companionship, and she asks her husband if her sis­
ters might visit her. He discourages her, tells her that she is seeking her 
own destruction. Heedless, she persists. Finally, her husband relents, cau­
tioning her that she should not be persuaded of trying to see him, other­
wise she would lose him forever. The sisters visit and become con­
vinced, because of Psyche’s evasive replies, that she has never seen her 
husband. Upon their departure, Psyche plies them with gold and jewels, 
and thus they leave envious, plotting her downfall.
That night her husband warns Psyche that it is unwise to see her sis­
ters, but she replies that since she cannot see him, can she not then be 
permitted to see others? He again yields, repeating his warning that she 
is promoting her own destruction. Despite this, the sisters return saying 
that they have proof that the oracle of Apollo is correct and that Psyche’s 
husband is a fearful winged-serpent. They badger her endlessly about 
this, until, finally, Psyche comes to the conclusion that ‘once and for all’ 
she must know.
So, knife in one hand, lamp in the other, Psyche approaches the bed 
upon which her husband is sleeping. Raising the lamp, she is so struck 
by his beauty and so overcome by her own faithlessness that she drops 
the knife. Falling to her knees in awe, she spills a drop of hot oil on her 
husband’s shoulder. He awakens and wordlessly flees out into the night. 
Desperate, Psyche follows him into the darkness; only his voice remains: 
‘I am the God of Love, and Love cannot live where there is no trust!’21
To recapitulate the above section of the myth in more Kierkegaar- 
dian terms, we could say that it is Cupid who has established the relation 
and upon whom Psyche is in total dependence. Technically, he is both a 
factor of the synthesis and the establisher of the synthetic relation itself 
and, thus, occupies a position more respective of a Peircean Third. Be 
that as it may, Psyche is married to ... ? Whom? What? For Psyche, there 
is, in effect, no other known factor to the synthesis. She is the wife of an
unknown quantity. In other words, in seeking to know the true aspect, 
the true identity, of her unseen husband, she has succumbed to the sec­
ond form of despair: wanting in despair to be oneself which, for Psyche, 
lies in wanting to be a wife where wife, of course, is defined as ones be­
ing related to a husband. To phrase it in mathematical terms, if Y = f(X) 
and X = 0, then it is quite possible that Y = 0, too. And it is this, herself 
in someone else, that Psyche seeks to find with knife and lamp in hand. 
O f course, she fails.
It will, of course, be noted that Psyche has, ostensibly, done the right 
thing by turning toward Cupid in her despair. He is, after all, the one 
who has established the whole relation. But it should be noted that there 
are two arguments against the rectitude of this position. The first being 
that Psyche does not know that it is Cupid Himself who is her husband; 
the second being that she has turned to Cupid qua husband, i.e., the 
other factor in the synthesis and not to Cupid qua god, the establisher of 
their union.
If a person in despair is, as he thinks, aware of his despair and doesn’t refer 
to it mindlessly as something that happens to him (...), and wants now on his 
own, all on his own, and with all his might to remove the despair, then he is still 
in despair and through all his seeming effort only works himself all the more 
deeply into a deeper despair. The imbalance in despair is not a simple imbalance 
but an imbalance in a relation that relates to itself and which is established by 
something else. So the lack of balance in that for-itself’ relationship also reflects 
itself infinitely in the relation to the power which established it.22
At this point, Psyche’ rather like the prodigal son’ decides that she 
will seek to regain her husband, for despite the fact that he might no 
longer love her, it would be worth the rest of her life to show him that 
she did, in fact, love him and that she still does. Although she has no 
idea where to find him or how to reach him, she decides to go straight 
to Venus — a very good idea, because wounded Cupid, upon exiting the 
marital bedchamber, made straight for his mother. Already apprised of 
the situation, Venus laughs scornfully at the girl and sets her a series of 
impossible, almost Herculean, tasks in a feigned effort at ‘aiding’ Psyche 
in re-gaining her husband. The first is to sort by species a large pile of 
seeds before nightfall. Psyche, of course, is helped by animals — in this 
case, the ants. The second task is to gather wool from the fierce golden 
sheep that graze among the razor sharp reeds lining the riverbank. In 
this case, a reed tells her to wait until the sheep have left the river to rest 
and gather the wool off the reeds. O f course, she does as instructed. The
third task was to draw a flask of water from the black waterfall that fed 
the River Styx. Unable to climb the slimy rocks, she is helped by an 
eagle. You would think, at this point, that both Venus and Psyche would 
have caught on that this was an endless cycle, but no. Instead, Venus 
sends Psyche with a box to be filled by Proserpine (Persephone), the 
Queen of Hades, with her netherworldly beauty, since Venus has be­
come haggard nursing Cupid. And so, Psyche sets off — and meets with 
no real obstacles. Except, that is, herself. Her curiosity and her vanity. 
Looking into the box, she sees nothing; instead, she falls into a deep and 
deathly sleep. Enter the God of Love.
Here we see that Psyche has sought to remove her despair by her 
own efforts. Just as she defied Cupid s warnings and eventually achieved 
her own unhappiness, she likewise defies the removal of his love, and 
seeks if not to reclaim him, at least to show him how much she loved 
him. (Would that she had loved him enough before his departure to have 
been obedient to him. All sin is defiance. All defiance leads to despair. 
But that is another story.) What she is truly seeking, then, is vindication of 
her despair. There are seeds of demonic rage in Psyche s duels of activity 
with Venus. Without the subsequent intervention of the God of Love, it 
is quite possible that Psyche s despair in willing herself to be ‘her self’ 
might have led her to believe that self to be not Cupid s wife but Venus’s 
nemesis (which, in fact, Cupid and Psyche united are).
This then is the formula which describes the state of the self when despair is 
completely eradicated: in relating to itself and in wanting to be itself the self is 
grounded transparently in the power that established it.23
By this time, Cupid is healed of his wound and looking for Psyche. 
Venus tried locking him in his rooms, but he flew out the window, and 
there below him, just near the palace, is Psyche. He wipes the sleep from 
her eyes, pricks her with the tip of one of his arrows, scolds her for her 
curiosity, and tells her to carry the box into his mother, for all would be 
well, and all would be well, and all manner of things be well.
Cupid, meanwhile, flies off to Olympus and gets Jupiter to consent 
to his marriage with Psyche. So, Psyche is formally married to Cupid; as 
a wedding present, she is made immortal by the drinking of the divine 
ambrosia, and they all live happily ever after, etc., etc., et cetera.
In this strange interplay of chance and faith, grace and sin, the God 
of Love has found the Soul. Was it mere chance that Cupid saw Psyche? 
Or did it reflect the faith represented by all her trials for Venus? Or was 
it a matter of the grace of Cupid s enduring love? Or was it the blanket­
ing effect of Psyche’s sins — disobedience, curiosity, vanity — that gave 
her immortality? It is a murky interplay. Had Psyche been awake when 
Cupid found her, might she have rejected his advances in a demonic 
rage? Then thank goodness that she peered into Persephone’s box. But 
what if she had fallen into that deadly sleep somewhere where Cupid 
could not see her? Then what would have happened? And what, for 
goodness sake, suddenly gave Cupid the courage to go public with his 
love? What if Venus had not tried to send Psyche to hell by asking her to 
fill the box in the first place? What then?
Faith is: that the self in being itself and in willing to be itself rests transpar­
ently in God.24 What we do know is that Psyche in her deadly sleep was, 
in effect, dead in her sins. Had she not been defiant, she would not have 
been working for Venus. Had she not been curious, she would have nei­
ther sought to see her husband nor would she have opened Persephone’s 
box. Moreover, we know she was vain, for she wanted Perspehone’s 
beauty. Furthermore, she had hubris enough to consider herself capable 
of being loved by a god and earning that god’s affections. Dead in hers 
sins, she lay in vulnerable sleep — that most transparent of human states, 
in which a person can lie neither to himself nor to another.
And there the God of Love found her. And knowing all this about 
her, he still chose to awaken her and take her as his bride. Furthermore, 
he bestowed upon her the gift of immortality. But this should not come 
as a surprise. For Psyche has, in her relation to Cupid, simply become 
what she truly is and, thus, what she had truly been all along: immortal. 
For she could not have been in despair in the first place had she not al­
ready been, in some sense, eternal or immortal. Otherwise her despair 
would have consumed her.
A Concluding Synthesis
It was noted above that Psyche’s despair did not kill her. Rather, like 
Moses’ burning bush, despair raged but did not consume. Kierkegaard 
points out that it is this very aspect of the sickness of despair that led 
Socrates to posit the immortality of the soul.25 Unlike a disease of the 
body in which the body is consumed — a consumption of like by like, in 
a sense — there is something different about some element of the soul 
which prevents its consumption, and hence removes the possiblity of re­
lief from the disease even through death. But, perhaps, I should say the
self and not the soul? For the self is defined as ‘the whole relation’, not 
merely the negative third between body and soul (Kierkegaards term) 
and the synthesis between infinite and finite, temporal and eternal, free­
dom and necessity; but also the relation that relates to itself or that in the 
relation which is its relating to itself
If the self qua noun could be considered as having a verbal aspect, 
i.e., its relating, could it be that the inability of despair to consume its 
victim is related to the active principle of the self: its relating? As such, 
the self pre-exists the experience of despair for which existence despair 
is the negative proof. Kierkegaard himself states as much: Where, then, does 
this despair come from? From the relation in which the synthesis relates itself to 
itself26 But he then goes on to add that despair results from the fact that 
God, who consitituted man a relation, releases it [the relation] from his hand, as 
it were}1 In other words, by releasing the relation, the synthesis, from his 
hand, God has removed that which the relation related to qua suste­
nance. And, inasmuch as spirit can be considered the active principle of 
this self, spirit is left with nothing to relate to and is, in effect, alienated 
and displaced. What it needs to relate to is no longer present. Deep calls 
unto deep, but no one is listening.
In the myth of Psyche, this can be represented by something I failed 
to recount in the story: namely, that Psyche herself never fell in love. 
Fundamentally, what she was looking for was not to be found among 
mortals. Nor, obviously, was what she was as a creature to be appreciat­
ed among mortals. Only a god known for his beauty could appreciate 
her beauty. Thus, she could only be satisfied by the love of a god who 
was, in a sense, one of her kind. She, of course, could not know that this 
was the longing of her heart. No one could. Just as she could not know 
what she had in Love until she chased him away though her faithlessness, 
so it is that in a similar fashion spirit longs for spirit, preferably the Spirit. 
And it is this spiritual sehnsucht which is the root of all despair.
Longing, like despair is an interesting thing. It can be articulated, but 
it cannot be communicated. Moreover, while it cannot be communicat­
ed, it can be understood. For example, if I say that I long for cranberry 
sauce, I have articulated my longing, but I have not communicated it. 
However, should someone have actually understood my longing that 
would be because they do, in fact, somehow share my longing, and not 
because I have somehow communicated that longing to them. In this 
sense, a longing is rather like a joke (or a physiological need like thirst). 
One either gets it or one does not. So it is also with the self.
To explain myself (pun intended), I must here go back to the semi­
otic interpretation of the self as a Fourthness, a positive third, or what 
can essentially be viewed as a social relation within itself, a fundamental 
intrasubjectivity where the two subjects are God and the self (and where 
despair can consequently be viewed as the self talking merely to itself). 
And to clarify myself, I must return once again to the metaphor of mar­
riage and that annoying tendency of long-married couples to engage in 
‘couplespeak’. My brother and his wife do this all the time.
Cheryl: ‘Did you -  ?’
Matt: ‘Yes.’





The only thing I knew was that this conversation had something to do 
with their cat.
For me, the above ‘conversation’ — despite all its communicative glances 
— told me nothing, because I was not inside the marriage, the context, the 
mediating medium. For this reason, I ‘just didn’t get it’. But in pseudo- 
Peircean terms, this is a set of signs that is fundamentally meaningless with­
out Matt, Cheryl, and their marriage. For this reason it requires Fourthness, 
the positive Kierkegaardian third. The self is a similar relation inasmuch 
as it relates concomitantly to itself and God via spirit. Consequently, the 
self suffers from the same problem that I had with Cheryl and Matt: it is 
unintelligible, fundamentally, to the outsider. Observable, but incompre­
hensible, for while I know that Matt and Cheryl are married, are a pair, 
what this means I could not even presume to explain. I can, however, 
observe that it is something so unique as to occasionally render their 
speech entirely exclusive, completely (interpersonal, prototypically intra- 
subjective. Likewise, with the self, any self. To paraphrase Kierkegaard: 
that a self is something different from what it immediately is underlies the 
mystification of the [self], for the [self] is only for the one who know that it is a 
[self] and in the strictest sense only for the one who knows what it means;28 for 
everyone else the self is, in fact, a sign like any other sign and is thus no 
more and no less than that which it immediately is, appears, and seems: 
namely, just another human being, another simple synthesis.29
As I draw to a conclusion, it should not be surprising that I should, 
as in the above paraphrased quote, return to Kierkegaard’s incipient semi­
otics as found in Practice in Christianity, for Kierkegaard’s self is, above 
all, a communicating and communal self. It is a community, not an ag­
gregate. The sum of the ‘parts’ creates a new ‘whole’, a Fourth. But, like 
any community, its nature can only be known through participation in, 
and by identification with, that community. In other words, it cannot be 
known immediately. It cannot be instantaneously transformed into a First. 
It must be savored.
Appendix:
A little refresher course on Peirce’s 
phenomenological semiotics
For Peirce, the catergories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness reflect 
his semiotic elements (Firsts, Seconds, and Thirds) and consequently 
form the basis of his phenomenological ‘system’.30 As you know, in its 
phenomenological guise, Firstness is the category of qualia. Where such 
qualia or qualities are the ‘mere may-be’s’31 of objects or phenomena or, 
more fundamentally, of Firsts themselves. In other words, a red ball con­
sists of an object (a First, the ball) which has the qualia or Firstness of 
redness. Such redness or Firstness is dependent on the object and would 
not exist without the occurence of an object or First such as the ball 
which allows for expression of the quality ‘red’.
Secondness, the middle category, is the category of struggle and, 
thus, of interaction with an other, an object. Secondness is therefore also 
the category of experienced alterity and, as such, establishes a relation 
between the perceiver (for lack of a better term) and the object. In semi­
otic terms, such a relation results in a representamen of the object or 
Second where the representamen (i.e., mental percept of the object) ex­
ists in the mind of the perceiver. However, because a perceiver usually 
approaches an object with some expectation, some prejudice or theory 
in mind, another role of the object in the relation of Secondness is that 
of contradicting the perceiver s pre-established notions such that the rep­
resentamen is often, in fact, ‘~X?’ instead of ‘X!’. This being the case, 
the nature of Secondness as struggle is revealed, and this struggle is me­
diated by means of the category of Thirdness.
Thirdness, for Peirce, is the cateogry of thought, of law, and of
learning. A Third in semiotic terms is an interprétant (or mental con­
struct) which, when perceived in the mind of an other (again, a Third), 
explains (i.e., it interprets) the relation between the First and the Sec­
ond. Thus, Thirdness, as mediating thought, serves the phenomenologi­
cal function of relating Firstnesses and Secondnesses together in such a 
way that Thirdnesses can be used as diagnostic tools in future encounters 
with other Others, for Thirdness is ‘that which is what it is by virtue of 
imparting a quality to reactions in the future’.32 In other words, Third­
ness establishes those prejudices, those theories or Firsts, by which we 
will meet future objects, perceive or mis-perceive them as the case may 
be, and enter into the conflict of Secondness with the object, and once 
again require the services of Thirdness. It is a never-ending cycle (circle) 
of phenomenology.
The most interesting aspect of this cycle of phenomenology is the 
manner in which it serves to establish the self. According to Peirce, the 
self is established by negation. In speaking about self-consciousness, 
Peirce writes that a ‘child hears it said that the stove is hot. But it is not, 
he says (...). But he touches it, and finds the [others’] testimony con­
firmed in a striking33 way. Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it 
is necessary to suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere (...). In 
short, error appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a self 
which is fallible. Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private 
selves (...)’.34 We can only (come to) know ourselves by knowing, en­
countering, our errors and ignorance. In fact, ‘cognizability (in its widest 
sense) and being are not merely metaphysically the same, but are synony­
mous terms’.35 In other words, to know is to be; more precisely, to know 
that you are wrong is to know that you are, and therefore, you are. A  
somewhat inverted Descartes: Erro ergo sum. Nevertheless, self-conscious­
ness and the self remain rather dubious. A self is merely supposed. It is 
the necessary device for explaining the existence of error. Therefore, I 
suspect that for Peirce qua logician, qua phenomenologist, the self is it­
self of little fundamental philosophic interest.
This lacuna in Peirce’s philosophy should, however, be of great inter­
est to those whose work it is to explain Peirce’s philosophy, especially his 
later writings on ethics. For how does one establish an ethics within a 
philosophy that has no positive construction of that very self which is 
engaging in said ethical action? That particular discussion, while reserved 
for another time and another place, usually gives rise to three responses 
among students of Peirce. The first is to attempt some sort of semiotic
construction of the self. This is all very well and good, but with one 
small drawback: such a semiotic definition of the self continues on ad in­
finitum. Every Third becomes a First which then encounters a Second 
and is subsequently mediated by a Third which in its turn becomes a 
First which then encounters . . .ad nauseum. A clever argument, but not 
existentially satisfying. A second option is to follow in Peirce’s own Bud- 
dhistic-Swedenborgian footsteps and view individual humans as venues 
by which the cosmos comes to know and (in a sense) love itself. This 
idea is an extension of Peirces concept o f ‘evolutionary love’36 (agapasti- 
cism) with its pro-creative blend of synechism (continuity) and tychism 
(chance), a moderated Darwinism in which all things do, in fact, ‘work 
together for good’37 within evolutionary time. Such a view, however, 
only solves the problem of the self by eliminating the self qua individual. 
This, of course, is no answer at all, and even less existentially satisfying 
than the first — unless one really does consider oneself as a mere instanti­
ation of the cosmos and nothing more.
A third option, and perhaps the one most often taken, is to find 
respite in another author or philosopher. Strangely enough (then again 
perhaps not) the thinker of choice is quite often Kierkegaard — a man 
who talks incessantly about the self. Given Kierkegaards very loquacity 
on the subject one might perhaps be led to think that Kierkegaard and 
Peirce fit together like some kind of lock-and-key mechanism in which 
opposites attract and complement one another. Or, even, that Kierke­
gaard’s view of the self builds upon elements actually found in Peirce and 
expands upon them. Or, that Kierkegaard’s discourse on the self fills 
Peirce’s existential silence. Unfortunately, despite tacit presentation as 
such, that is not the actual state of affairs.
Peirce holds to the notion that one can only know the self through 
negation such that there is no positive knowledge of the self via identity. 
As such ‘individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only 
by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, 
and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is man, 
‘proud man, /  Most ignorant of what he’s most assured, /  His glassy es­
sence”.38 In other words, individual man is only a negation inasmuch as 
such reflects him qua error. But this is only inasmuch as he is ‘anything 
apart from his fellows'. The tacit assumption here is that an individual man 
is not merely nothing apart from his fellows, but, given that his individu­
ality is based on negation, that an individual man is also nothing with his 
fellows? He is no longer an individual; he has lost his individuality in
agreement with, and in absence of difference and negation from, his fel­
lows. Or, to approach it from another angle, given evolutionary love, 
which is leading the entire cosmos to ‘goodness’, the individual who 
agrees with his fellows in effect agrees with the cosmos and is conse­
quently subsumed by the cosmos. Such an ‘individual’ is, effectively, a 
mere instantiation of the cosmos. He is no longer an individual in the 
strong sense of the word. Again, the individual, the self, has been negat­
ed. The self is merely the result of knowledge, of wisdom, and — espe­
cially in Peirce’s case — ‘the scientific method’39, whereby the community 
of scientific inquirers engages in determining Thirds — including that 
Third known as the self — such that not even the self can escape the nev­
er-ending cycle (circle) of phenomenology which was mentioned above.
Such a never-ending cycle of phenomenology would be incredibly 
painful if it were a matter of the positive establishing of a self.40 However, 
we know from Peirce that the result of this process is not the creation 
but the diminuition of the self into nothingness. But there is a notewor­
thy peculiarity in Peirce’s concept of Thirdness, and therefore of a Third, 
in that -  as previously stated — a ‘Third in semiotic terms is an interpré­
tant which, when perceived in the mind of an other (again, a Third), ex­
plains the relation between the First and the Second’. ‘The mind of an 
other’ nowhere does Peirce take into consideration this other qua Other. 
While he speaks of the necessity of a group of scientists (i.e., the scientif­
ic community) for discovering the truth, it is for the sake of the truth -  
not the members of the group — that such community is necessary. In 
other words, Peirce, with his preoccupation that everything is some in­
stantiation of mind, never really observes that those minds are, in fact, 
embodied and, thus, that all acquisition of knowledge has a social di­
mension. Subsequently, he does not perceive that a Third and even 
Thirdness itself has a social aspect, despite the fact, as previously men­
tioned, that a Third or Thirdness as mediating thought serves the phe­
nomenological function of relating Firstnesses and Secondnesses together 
in such a way that Thirdnesses can be used as diagnostic tools in future 
encounters with other Others. Thirdness is ‘that which is what it is by 
virtue of imparting a quality to reactions in the future’.41 Peirce speaks as 
if it is only thoughts which encounter other thoughts.
I would like to point out that the above reveals an aspect of Third­
ness that distinguishes it drastically from either Firstness or Secondness. 
Specifically, the fact that Thirdness moves in two different directions. First­
ness, for example, exists in the object and moves toward the perceiver
who perceives it qua representamen. Secondness exists in the mind of 
the perceiver toward the object where the object counters it, resulting in 
the affirmation or negation of the perceivers current representamen. 
Note that the representamen can be either affirmed or negated, resulting 
in an interprétant. Yet Peirce s fundamental assumption is that it will be 
negated. Thus, Secondness is not simply a matter of alterity for Peirce, 
but of the brutality to be found in the struggle of and with alterity. The 
other oddity is that Peirce requires an other to affirm the interprétant. 
He draws upon sociality, yet does not directly articulate it or explicitly 
integrate it into his project, given that an interprétant is quite literally 
how an object is communicated from one mind to another. In this way, 
the second mind affirms or negates the object-experience of the first 
mind. For Peirce, the more minds, the merrier, and, hence, the more 
accurate, ergo the need for the community of scientists. In other words, 
Peirces semiotics and phenomenology depend upon intersubjectivity, 
and yet the most he will do is articulate an interobjectivity. But that in­
tersubjectivity which is nonetheless present, unarticulated, in the Peircean 
canon may be called Fourthness.
But what happens (within the Peircean cosmos) when it is the indi­
vidual who is the object of this community of scientists? Is a stone al­
tered or affected if it is mistaken for cubic zirconium, even though it is, 
in all actuality, a diamond? No, it is merely an object beset by erring sub­
jects. (Besides, for Peirce, evolutionary love, by means of the community 
of scientists, will eventually amend this discrepancy.) But a person, a true 
subject, who — although a mere instance of the cosmos — attempt to un­
derstand itself’ may, indeed, suffer under such error. He may, in fact, be 
torn apart by mis-identification, only to be joyfully restored to whole­
ness by correct identification, a wholeness which is subsequently shat­
tered by an error which is healed by correct recognition which is then 
. . .et cetera. This is also an unending cycle. When ones quest for identity, 
for selfhood, for individuality, is dependent on fickle alterity, the result is 
an almost infinite flux between not wanting to be whatever it is that is 
oneself and wanting to be whatever it is that you have been told is your­
self. In other words, it is despair. Enter Kierkegaard, sotto voce, stage right.
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